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CHARLES DUAN*

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, a federal computer
trespass statute that prohibits accessing a computer "without
authorization or exceeding authorized access," has often been
criticized for clashing with online norms, over-criminalizing
common behavior, and infringing freedom-of-expression interests.
These controversies over the CFAA have raised difficult questions
about how the statute is to be interpreted, with courts of appeals split
on the properconstructionand the Supreme Court set to considerthe
law in its current October Term 2020.
This article considers the CFAA in a new light, namely its
effects on competition. Rather than merely preventing injurious
trespass upon computers, the CFAA has become a favorite legal tool
for dominant firms in the computer services industry to suppress
competition, expand their market control, and impose transaction
costs that limit consumer choice. To explore how the CFAA
implicates competition, two novel approaches are used. First, this
article compares prior uses of the CFAA to competition issues
identified in the computer industry and other fields. This
comparison reveals that the CFAA has the ability to insulate from
legal scrutiny activity that at a minimum raises serious questions
about negative effects on competition. Second, the articledraws upon
the theory and law of intellectual property, in particular trade
secrets and copyright. Because it protects information but lacks the
competition-protective features of copyrights and trade secrets, the
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CFAA essentially creates an ad hoc intellectualproperty regime that
enables the improper suppression of competition.

The legislative history of the CFAA suggests that Congress did
not intend the computer intrusion statute to supplant intellectual
property law or to be a tool for suppressing competition. To ensure
consistency with this legislative intent, then, this article posits that
the CFAA should be narrowly construed such that access "without
authorization"does not include violations of restrictions on how
accessed data is subsequently used. At least from a competition
policy perspective, a narrow construction is favorable over the broad
one.
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INTRODUCTION

As originally drawn, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
prohibits malicious trespass upon and intrusion into computer
systems,' an activity colloquially called "computer hacking." 2
1. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (West, Westlaw through
Pub. L. No. 116-259).
2. The term "hacking" is notoriously problematic in that it more properly refers to
the salutary behavior of devising unexpected, often efficient ways of achieving a desired
result, particularly on a computer. See generally Ben Yagoda, A Short History of "Hack,"
NEW YORKER (Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/ashort-history-of-hack [https://perma.cc/HPZ3-EJ9M]. Its negative connotation, as
computer intrusion, is a semantic narrowing likely resulting from mainstream media
portrayals of teenage computer malfeasants around the 1980s. See id.; Orly TurgemanGoldschmidt, Meanings that Hackers Assign to Their Being a Hacker, 2 INT'L J. CYBER
CRIMINOLOGY 382, 383 (2008) (available at: http://www.cybercrimejournal.com/
Orlyijccdec2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/KAS9-2WXF]). For example, the film WarGames is
often credited for spurring passage of the CFAA. Mary M. Calkins, Note, They Shoot
Trojan Horses, Don't They? An Economic Analysis of Anti-Hacking Regulatory Models,
89 GEO. L.J. 171, 175 (2000) (discussing cultural impact of WarGames and relationship
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3
Enacted in 1984 and subsequently amended several times, the
CFAA imposes criminal and civil penalties upon anyone who
"intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or
4
exceeds authorized access" and thus causes any "damage and loss."
In the four decades since, the CFAA has left open a question
that courts have not been able to resolve: what is the scope of
"without authorization" under the statute; that is, when does a
5
person's access to a computer violate the statute? In general, the
law is amenable to two constructions. Under the "narrow"
construction, violation occurs only when the person has no
permission to access the computer at all and uses technical
circumvention or fraudulent credentials; under the "broad"
construction, even a person with permission to access the computer
may violate the CFAA if that person subsequently uses information
from the computer contrary to a contractual provision or terms of
use. 6 The federal appeals courts have split on these two

to the CFAA); see also Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act:
Hearings on H.R. 3181, HR. 3570, and H.R. 5112 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 185 (1983-1984), https://catalog.hathitrust.org/
Record/011341755 [https://perma.cc/829M-E7GN] (testimony of Peter Waal, Vice
President of Marketing, GTE-Telenet describing WarGames as a "realistic
representation" of computer intrusion), quoted in COUNTERFEIT ACCEsS DEVICE AND
COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 10 (1984). This
ambiguity is serendipitously apt for the title of this article, which contends that the
CFAA is an unexpected way to circumvent competition policy, but for purposes of clarity
the term is not used henceforth in this article.
3. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(C). The statute also contains several other pathways
giving rise to liability. See, e.g., id. § 1030(a)(5)(B) (liability for recklessly causing
damage). Civil penalties further require a showing of specific losses, such as losses
within one year totaling $5000 in value. See id. § 1030(g), (c)(4)(A)(i)(I). This threshold
is generally easily met. See Pac. Aerospace & Elecs., Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188,
1197 (E.D. Wash. 2003) (discussing EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d
577, 585 (1st Cir. 2001)).
5. For an early significant treatment of this question, see Orin S. Kerr,
Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting "Access" and "Authorization" in Computer Misuse
Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596 (2003) [hereinafter Kerr 2003]. The statutory phrase
"exceeds unauthorized access" raises similar questions, but since both phrases contain
the undefined term "authorization," courts have generally construed the two in tandem.
See, e.g., LVRC Holdings, LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009) (using
"exceeds unauthorized access" to interpret "without authorization"). The difference is not
relevant to this article, which focuses on what qualifies as a lack of authorization under
the statute.
6. See United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 525-28 (2d Cir. 2015) (discussing
alternative constructions of the CFAA). Obviously, this is a simplification; commentators
recognize a variety of diverse approaches. See generally Patricia L. Bellia, A Code-Based
Approach to Unauthorized Access Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 84 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1442, 1446-60 (2016) [hereinafter Bellia 2016]. For purposes of this
article, however, the above distinction suffices since the relevant tensions between the
CFAA and competition policy largely align with conditions on subsequent use of data.
See infra Section III.
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constructions, 7 and the Supreme Court recently granted a petition
for a writ of certiorari on the issue. 8
Commentators have vigorously analyzed these competing
interpretations of the CFAA from a variety of perspectives,
including norms of openness on the Internet, 9 the business of
website
scraping,lO
employer-employee
relationships
and
employee mobility, 11 overcriminalization of everyday behavior, 1 2
analogy to criminal law doctrines such as authorization and

7. See Valle, 807 F.3d at 524-25. For cases favoring the narrower construction, see
id. at 528; WEC Carolina Energy Sols., LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2012);
United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). For cases favoring
the broader construction, see United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir.
2010); Explorica Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582-83; Int'l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d
418, 420 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 (5th Cir. 2010).
8. See See Van Buren v. United States, No. 19-783 (June 3, 2021). After this article
was written but before it went to press, the Supreme Court issued its decision in the
case, which is discussed infra notes 174-181..
9. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143,
1161 (2016) [hereinafter Kerr 2016] (arguing that the CFAA ought to mirror the
"presumptively open norms for the Web"); Jamie L. Williams, Automation Is Not
"Hacking": Why Courts Must Reject Attempts to Use the CFAA as an Anti-Competitive
Sword, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 416, 446 (2018) ("[I]t is necessary to ensure that the
CFAA cannot be used to undermine open access to publicly available information
online .... "); Christine D. Galbraith, Access Denied: Improper Use of the Computer
Fraudand Abuse Act to ControlInformation on PubliclyAccessible Internet Websites, 63
MD. L. REV. 320, 324 (2004) ("[A] sweeping reading of prohibited acts under the CFAA
threatens the free flow of information that belongs in the public domain. As a result, the
continued openness of the Internet, along with its attendant benefits, is at risk.").
10. See, e.g., Andrew Sellars, Twenty Years of Web Scraping and the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 372, 412-13 (2018) (discussing
implications of the CFAA for web scraping technologies, which provide important
benefits to consumers and the public).
11. See, e.g., Pamela Taylor, To Steal or Not to Steal: An Analysis of the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act and Its Effect on Employers, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 201, 203 (2012);
Katherine M. Field, Agency, Code, or Contract: Determining Employees' Authorization
Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107 MICH. L. REV. 819, 821-22 (2009)
(discussing application of the CFAA to employment cases); Glenn R. Schieck,
UndercuttingEmployee Mobility: The ComputerFraudand Abuse Act in the Trade Secret
Context, 79 BROoK. L. REV. 831, 844 (2014) ("Further, the CFAA allows employers to
effectively enforce non-compete agreements that would be otherwise unenforceable
under state law in cases where former employees use misappropriated information to
compete in a new position.").
12. See, e.g., Sarah A. Constant, The Computer Fraudand Abuse Act: A Prosecutor's
Dream and a Hacker's Worst Nightmare-The Case AgainstAaron Swartz and the Need
to Reform the CFAA, 16 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 231, 248 (2013) (describing the
CFAA as "the ultimate catchall for computer infractions" that "gives prosecutors the
power to pile charges onto unsuspecting Internet and computer users"); Nicholas A.
Wolfe, Hacking the Anti-Hacking Statute: Using the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to
Secure Public Data Exclusivity, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 301, ¶ 11, at 306 (2015)
(noting that broad construction of the CFAA "inadvertently increased potential for many
of us to be categorized as hackers").
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14
consent, 13 reference to technical computer security measures,
15
The broad
and effects on "white hat" cybersecurity research.
with
inconsistent
construction of the statute has been criticized as
16
the Due Process Clause's
the rule of lenity in criminal law,
17
prohibition on vagueness in criminal statutes, equal protection
18
freedom of expression under the First
under the Constitution,
19
legislative history. 20
statute's
the
and
Amendment,
This article approaches interpretation of the CFAA and in
particular the "without authorization" question from a different
perspective, namely competition policy. Powerful remedies and
21
have turned the federal
broad civil enforcement abilities
computer trespass statute into a forceful tool for dominant firms,

13. See, e.g., Josh Goldfoot & Aditya Bamzai, A Trespass Frameworkfor the Crime
of Hacking, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1477, 1479 (2016) (authorization under the CFAA
should mirror physical trespass law's authorization doctrine); James Grimmelmann,
Consenting to Computer Use, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1500, 1521 (2016) (proposing
construction of "authorization" under the CFAA "as incorporating the traditional legal
understanding of consent, as seen, for example, in the criminal law of trespass, theft;
battery, and rape").
14. See, e.g., Kerr 2003, supra note 5, at 1649 (proposing that "without
authorization" be limited to "access that circumvents restrictions by code"); Cyrus Y.
Chung, The Computer Fraudand Abuse Act: How Computer Science Can Help with the
Problem of Overbreadth, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 233, 250 (2010) (suggesting analogy to
computer filesystem access control lists to define authorization under the CFAA).
15. See, e.g., Trevor A. Thompson, Terrorizing the Technological Neighborhood
Watch: The Alienation and Deterrenceof the "White Hats" Under the CFAA, 36 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 537, 567-68 (2009) (discussing the CFAA's deterrent effect on computer
security researchers); Komal S. Patel, Note, Testing the Limits of the First Amendment:
How Online Civil Rights Testing Is Protected Speech Activity, 118 COLwM. L. REV. 1473,
1477-83 (2018) (describing computer testing research to uncover algorithmic
discrimination).
16. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 11, at 218-19 (favoring narrow construction of the
CFAA in view of "logical application of the criminal lenity rule").
17. See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1562 (2010) [hereinafter Kerr 2010] (contending that broad
construction of the CFAA is unconstitutionally vague because it "would either provide
insufficient notice of what is prohibited or fail to provide guidelines for law enforcement
in violation of the constitutional requirement of Due Process of Law"); Patricia L. Bellia,
Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2258 (2004) [hereinafter Bellia 2004]
(broad interpretation of the CFAA "might raise due process concerns, in that criminal
liability would attach without a user having fair notice of the prohibited conduct").
18. See Laurent Sacharoff, Criminal Trespass and Computer Crime, 62 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 571, 645-46 (comparing effects of the CFAA to racial discrimination based on
physical trespass law).
19. See Patel, supra note 15, at 1475-76 (considering First Amendment violations
resulting from the CFAA's application to testing of online services for civil rights
violations); Galbraith, supranote 9, at 323 ("Recent court decisions have allowed website
owners to utilize the CFAA to override the carefully balanced provisions of the copyright
laws and improperly restrict speech in violation of the First Amendment.").
20. See, e.g., Bellia 2004, supra note 17, at 2253-57 (narrow construction of the
CFAA better aligns with statutory language and legislative history).
21. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 116-259) (criminal
penalties); § 1030(i)-(j) (criminal forfeiture of computer equipment); § 1030(g) (civil
action).
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especially firms in the information technology industry, to engage
in conduct that harms not just competitors but competition in
general. This article reviews multiple instances of litigation under
the CFAA that fit this pattern. 22 Insofar as Congress almost
certainly did not intend the CFAA to be used for anticompetitive
purposes and those purposes contravene other established federal
policy, 2 3 this article concludes that the statute should be construed
to avoid anticompetitive uses and the narrower construction better
does so.
To be sure, both courts and commentators have asserted that
the broad construction makes the CFAA into an "anti-competitive
sword," though without substantial consideration of how exactly
the statute interacts with competition policy.24 This article
uncovers that interaction from two points of view. Section I
compares several the CFAA cases with specific issues that have
arisen
in
competition
policy,
including
technological
interoperability, 25 cheap exclusion, 26 input foreclosure, 27 and price
obfuscation. 2 8 This comparison reveals that CFAA assertion, under
a broad construction of the statute, enables and insulates business
activity that either contravenes competition law or is at least highly
questionable under it.29
Section II reveals the deleterious effects of the CFAA on
competition from the perspective of intellectual property law, in
particular copyrights and trade secrets. Others have observed

22. See infra Section I.
23. See infra Section II.C.
24. Williams, supra note 9, at 416, 420-21 (noting "skirmishes between competing
commercial services" but focusing on Internet openness concerns instead); see also
Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 970 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (noting that
"[a]pplying the CFAA to publicly available website information presents uncomfortable
possibilities," but nevertheless construing the statute to cover such information); Joseph
Oat Holdings, Inc. v. RCM Digesters, Inc., 409 F. App'x 498, 506 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting
in passing that "[s]ome commentators have noted that suits under anti-hacking laws
have gone beyond the intended scope of such laws and are increasingly being used as a
tactical tool to gain business or litigation advantages.") (quoting Andrew B. Serwin,
Poised on the Precipice:A CriticalExamination of Privacy Litigation, 25 SANTA CLARA
HIGH TECH. L.J. 883, 887 (2009)); Galbraith, supra note 9, at 324; Breana Love, The
Chaos of the CFAA: Facebook's Successful CFAA Claim Affects Website Owners,
Competitors, and You, 50 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 831, 842-43 (2017) (criticizing major
websites' use of the CFAA "not to protect their platforms, but to eradicate competing
third party businesses" though focusing more on consequences for "everyday users").
25. See infra text accompanying notes 40-57.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 57-61.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 68-76.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 91-103.
29. See infra Section I.
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30
and trade
tension between the CFAA and both copyrights
31
but the competition policy effects of the CFAAsecrets,
intellectual property relationship have generally not been explored,
which has led commentators to take a variety of positions on
whether the CFAA as a normative matter ought to override
intellectual property law. 32 Simultaneous consideration of
intellectual property theory and competition policy resolves this
normative question due to the observation that copyrights and
trade secrets, like all forms of intellectual property, include
doctrinal limitations that are specifically intended to promote
competition.33 Insofar as the CFAA enables firms to create quasiintellectual property rights without the balancing limitations of
copyrights or trade secrets, the computer trespass statute
undermines competition beyond the intentions of Congress and

&

30. See, e.g., Wolfe, supra note 12, ¶ 5, at 303 (describing the CFAA "as a paracopyright tool to secure exclusivity to otherwise publicly accessible data"); Galbraith,
supra note 9, at 323; Kathleen C. Riley, Data Scraping as a Cause of Action: Limiting
Use of the CFAA and Trespass in Online Copying Cases, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245, 305-06 (2019) (proposing application of copyright law rather
than the CFAA in cases of data scraping).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)
(describing how the CFAA's "general purpose is ... not misappropriation of trade
secrets"); Kyle W. Brenton, Trade Secret Law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act:
Two Problems and Two Solutions, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 429, 447-50 (2009)
(describing how the CFAA "disserves the fundamental policy goals of trade secret
protection"); Omri Rachum-Twaig & Ohad Somech, Breaking into an Empty House: A
Theory of Remedies for CFAA UnauthorizedAccess to Non-ProprietaryInformation, 82
ALB. L. REV. 555, 555-56 (2019) (noting "significant tension between the CFAA
unauthorized access doctrine and basic understandings of (lack of) property rights in
information," including copyright and trade secrets law); Schieck, supra note 11, at 856
("Beyond eroding the theoretical policy considerations of trade secret law, the CFAA's
lack of a reasonably protective measures requirement may discourage employers from
adequately investing in data protection, which is economically inefficient."); Field, supra
note 11, at 846 (describing broad interpretation of the CFAA as "an arrow capable of
overriding traditional trade secret liability and thus disrupting established policy
preferences in employment law").
32. Compare references cited supra note 31 with Tiffany A. Miao, Access Denied:
How Social Media Accounts Fall Outside the Scope of Intellectual PropertyLaw and into
the Realm of the Computer Fraudand Abuse Act, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
ENT. L.J. 1017, 1060-61 (2013) (contending that the CFAA "better protects" social media
information that is unprotectable under intellectual property law), Graham M. Liccardi,
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A Vehicle for Litigating Trade Secrets in Federal
Court, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. 155, 157 (2008) ("The CFAA ... has a distinct
advantage in that it protects all valuable computer data regardless of whether it is
proven a trade secret under state law."), and Patrick J. Manion, Two Steps Forward, One
Step Back: The Defend Trade SecretsAct of 2016 and Why the Computer Fraudand Abuse
Act of 1984 Still Matters for Trade Secret Misappropriation,43 J. LEGIs. 289, 292 (2016)
("I conclude by arguing that the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act may be a more attractive
remedy for trade secret misappropriation claims considering recent state and federal
trends disfavoring non-compete covenants and in light of the state non-compete carve
out provisions of the Defend Trade Secrets Act").
33. See infra text accompanying notes 121-133 (discussing trade secrets); infra text
accompanying notes 138-144 (discussing copyrights).
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state legislators. Indeed, because relevant amendments to the
CFAA were debated and enacted in tandem with a federal trade
secrets law, 34 the intellectual property and competition perspective
on the CFAA allows the legislative history to illuminate the proper
interpretation of the statute in ways heretofore not considered in
the literature. 35
In view of this analysis of the CFAA in light of competition
issues and intellectual property theory, Section III concludes that a
narrower construction better effectuates congressional intent and
positive competition policy compared to the broader construction.
Two specific narrower constructions
are considered: an
entitlement-based test, where access without authorization occurs
only when the accessor has no entitlement to access the data for
any reason; and a code-based test, where a denial of authorization
must be in the form of computer code restricting access. Both
narrower constructions better serve competition policy, and while
they cannot prevent all anticompetitive behavior involving the
CFAA, the behaviors that remain unchecked, namely technological
access restrictions designed to inhibit competition, are less
problematic from a competition perspective because they are harder
to implement, easier to identify, and more amenable to challenge
under the antitrust laws.
I.

HOW THE

CFAA Is USED TO BLOCK COMPETITION

In addition to being a criminal statute, the CFAA includes
extensive civil liability and remedies. 36 In view of the broad
interpretation of the statute embraced by several courts of
appeals, 37 businesses have frequently invoked the CFAA not to
prevent computer intrusion or trespass but to suppress competition

by "restrict[ing] their competitors' access to information they've
published publicly online for the rest of the world to see." 38
In particular, the CFAA has been used in at least three
anticompetitive contexts: to stymie direct competitors, to close off
platforms to new startups, and to interfere with tools that advance
consumer choice.

34. See Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA), Pub. L. No. 104-294 tit. II, 110 STAT.
3488, 3491.
35. See infra Section II.C.
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 116-259).
37. See cases cited supra note 7.
38. Williams, supra note 9, at 420.
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Competitor Blocking by Incumbent Companies

Most directly, the broad reading of the CFAA enables
companies, social media platforms in particular, to stop competitors
from building competing services. A review of judicial opinions
under that law found that "[a] tremendous number of these
opinions concern claims brought by direct commercial competitors
39
or companies in closely adjacent markets to each other."
In a striking example, found in Facebook, Inc. v. Power
Ventures, Inc., a startup social networking service called Power.com
enabled individuals to aggregate their content and relationships
40
from multiple existing services onto a simple, unified system. To
enable this aggregation, a user would authorize Power.com to
collect information from existing social media services by accessing
the user's account on each service. 41 One of these existing services,
Facebook, demanded that Power.com cease and desist from
accessing data this way, and subsequently sued under the CFAA.42
While the Ninth Circuit recognized that Power.com had initial
authorization to access Facebook data, it held that the cease-anddesist letter revoked any further access, rendering Power.com in
violation of the CFAA.43 To reach that conclusion, the court applied
a broad reading of that statute, under which a mere letter that
"warned Power that it may have violated federal and state law" was
44
As a result, Facebook
sufficient to render access unauthorized.
was able to leverage the CFAA to prevent a competitor from
accessing otherwise-available data to start a business.
Facebook's CFAA success against Power.com comes at a time
of controversy over the dominance of social media companies,
45
Scholars often attribute the lack of
including Facebook itself.
competition in the social media market to an economic phenomenon
called a "network externality" or "network effect," which occurs

/

39. Sellars, supra note 10, at 390 (footnote omitted).
40. See Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2016).
41. See id. at 1067.
42. See id. at 1063.
43. See id. at 1067.
44. See id. at 1067 n.3.
45. Within the United States, Facebook is facing antitrust inquiries from the
Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, Congress, and state attorneys
general. See John D. McKinnon, States to Launch Google, Facebook Antitrust Probes,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 6, 2019, 5:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/states-to-launch[https://perma.cc/6CAZ-Q6K9]; David
google-facebook-antitrust-probes-11567762204
McLaughlin, Attorney General Barr Seeks DOJFacebook Antitrust Probe, BLOOMBERG
9 9 25
2
(Sept. 25, 2019, 6:30 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 01 -0 [https://perma.cc/LZ2Sattorney-general-barr-sought-doj-facebook-antitrust-probe
AEB3]; Cecilia Kang, Jack Nicas, & David McCabe, Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google
Prepare for Their "Big Tobacco Moment," N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2020), https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/07/28/technology/amazon-apple-facebook-google-antitrust-hearing.
html [https://perma.cc/WD55-Y42J].
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when the value of a product to a consumer depends on the number
of other users of that product. 4 6 The classic example is the
telephone network, since the value of owning a telephone increases
as more people can be called with it,47 and modern social media
networks plainly display network effects in that their value
depends on how many people one can share content or be friends
with.48 Among other consequences of markets exhibiting network
effects is that users of the dominant product will tend to be
unwilling to switch to a new competitor that lacks an equally sized
user base, since that competitor's product will be of less value
simply by virtue of being new.49 In the social media context, users
of Facebook's leading service face difficulty switching to new
platforms because a new social network without Facebook's
expansive user base would be a less effective platform for
broadcasting content, messaging friends, and maintaining
relationships.50
To overcome the impediment to competition that network
effects present, policymakers and experts have looked to measures
to increase "interoperability," that is, to enable users to migrate to
competing social networks without loss of data or key
functionalities like messaging. 5 1 There have been calls to
encourage or even require data sharing or interoperability to enable
new competitor entry.52 Technology firms have historically
leveraged a wide range of legal strategies to hold up
interoperability, suggesting that at least in technology markets,
46. See generally CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A
STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 174-75, 183-84 (1998).
47. See JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS:
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 4-5 (2005).

48. See Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Social Networking, 90 N.C. L. REV.
1771, 1788 (2012).
49. See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 46, at 184-85.
50. See, e.g., Waller, supranote 48, at 1787-88. About nine years ago, Waller further
suggested that Facebook also maintains dominance by making it difficult for users to
retrieve their content to bring it over to competitors. See id. at 1788-92. But it is
generally fairly easy to retrieve content today, and more recent research suggests that
the problem with that retrieved data is that the data is not especially useful for
enhancing competition. See GABRIEL NICHOLAS & MICHAEL WEINBERG, DATA
PORTABILITY AND PLATFORM COMPETITION: IS USER DATA EXPORTED FROM FACEBOOK

+

ACTUALLY USEFUL TO COMPETITORS? 14-17 (2019), (available at: https://www.law.nyu.
edu/centers/engelberg/pubs/2019-11-06-Data-Portability-And-Platform-Competition)
[https://perma.cc/TKQ3-9XBW].
51. See, e.g., Gus Rossi & Charlotte Slaiman, Interoperability = Privacy
Competition, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/
interoperability-privacy-competition/ [https://perma.cc/LM9A-R7F6]; see also Rory Van
Loo, In Defense of Breakups: Administering a "Radical"Remedy, 105 CORNELL L. REV.
1955, 2006-12 (comparing "access remedies" such as interoperability to antitrust-based
firm breakups).
52. See Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching
(ACCESS) Act of 2019, S. 2658, 116th Cong. § 4(a) (Oct. 22, 2019).
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interoperability is especially important to competition (and thus
53
especially distasteful to dominant firms).
To be sure, "there is no consensus" as to how antitrust law
should account for "technologically dynamic markets characterized
54
The
by network effects," including matters of interoperability.
the
forecloses
it
that
is
though,
presents,
CFAA
the
problem that
for
difficult
is
It
entirely.
competition inquiry as to interoperability
which
over
dialogue
in
courts and lawmakers to engage
interoperability-restricting terms of service are anticompetitive if
the CFAA is understood to legitimize those terms of service by
55
Thus, as one
backing them with civil and criminal penalties.
commentator argues, the CFAA as interpreted in Power Ventures
"gives Facebook greater power to reduce its users' ability to control
their personal data, leading to further potential issues in the realm
56
of Internet monopolies."
Facebook's invocation of the CFAA against Power.com closely
matches a pattern that other commentators have observed of
dominant firms using regulatory systems to suppress competition.
Robert Bork devoted a full chapter of The Antitrust Paradox to
describing how the misuse of courts and governmental agencies is
a particularly effective means of delaying or stifling competition,
which he called "[p]redation by abuse of governmental
procedures." 5 7 He gave business licensing, zoning, health and
safety inspections, and sham litigation as examples of uses of public
interest legislation to delay or thwart competition.58 More recently,

53. See, e.g., Charles Duan, Of Monopolies and Monocultures: The Intersection of
Patents and National Security, 36 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 384 (2020)
[hereinafter Duan 2020] (noting invocation of national security concerns to avoid
injunction that otherwise would require licensing of patents covering technological
interoperability standards); Charles Duan, Internet of Infringing Things: The Effect of
Computer Interface Copyrights on Technology Standards, 45 RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH.
L.J. 1, 5-10 (2019) (discussing assertion of copyright in computer interfaces to prevent
COMPETITION,
SERVICE:
UNIVERSAL
MUELLER,
MILTON
interoperability);
INTERCONNECTION AND MONOPOLY IN THE MAING OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE

https://surface.syr.edu/books/18/
at:
(available
(2013)
129
SYSTEM
of
use
system's
telephone
(describing Bell
[https://perma.cc/F6JU-LAYL])
interoperability restrictions to the disadvantage of competing independent telephone
services); See generally Cory Doctorow, Adversarial Interoperability, ELEC. FRONTIER
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/10/adversarial2019),
2,
(Oct.
FOUND.
interoperability [https://perma.cc/Z8TU-YFZE] (noting examples of legal regimes
leveraged to prevent such interoperability, including patents, privacy, copyright, and
telecommunications).
54. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
55. As discussed below, courts have viewed the CFAA as potentially exempting
business activities from scrutiny under the antitrust or other laws. See infra notes 7682.
56. Love, supra note 24, at 845.
57. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 159-347 (1978).

58. See id. at 347-48.
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Susan Creighton and colleagues at the Federal Trade Commission
have described the phenomenon of "cheap exclusion," namely
business strategies that exclude competitors with little cost or risk
for firms engaging in them, and have called for "closer enforcement
scrutiny" with regard to such practices. 5 9 Among the cheap
exclusion strategies that they describe is the use of litigation or
litigation threats that take advantage of "cost/benefit asymmetries"
to delay competitor entry.60
A perhaps
unexpected
analogy may be found in
pharmaceutical regulations. Generic drug manufacturers must
obtain approval to market their products and compete with brandname pharmaceutical firms; 6 1 this approval includes showings that
their generic drugs are "the same as" and "bioequivalent to" the
already-approved brand-name products.6 2 To make this showing,
the generic manufacturers require samples of the brand-name
drug, and brand-name firms have on occasion refused to sell such
samples on the grounds that doing so would violate safety
regulations on the distribution of the drug. 6 3 Commentators and
competition authorities have described this behavior as "a
significant threat to competition" because it prevents the formation
of competitive markets for the drug and does not serve the purposes
of the safety regulations. 6 4
Akin to brand-name drug companies using a pharmaceutical
safety regulatory regime to block competition in drug markets by
holding up access to an ingredient necessary for regulatory
approval, dominant technology firms can use the CFAA's antitrespass provisions, when broadly construed, to block competition
in social media markets by holding up access to interoperability
59. Susan A. Creighton et al., Cheap Exclusion, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 975, 977 (2005).
60. Id. at 992-93. To be sure, both Bork and Creighton et al. discuss sham litigation,
but the CFAA cases are often meritorious at least in jurisdictions following the broad
construction. Nevertheless, their analyses are applicable because they describe
situations where litigation is "for the sake of exclusion, rather than on the merits." Id.
at 992; see also BORK, supra note 57, at 357-58 (describing "distinction between
legitimate and predatory litigation"). A CFAA plaintiff such as Facebook is likewise
seeking not to prevent injurious abuse of its computer systems but rather to exclude
competitors.
61. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), (j)(4) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-259).
62. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii)(II), (iv); see Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott
D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act: History, Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J.
585, 594 (2003).
63. See Michael A. Carrier, Sharing, Samples, and Generics: An Antitrust
Framework, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9-12 (2017); Henry N. Butler, REMS-Restricted
Drug Distribution Programs and the Antitrust Economics of Refusals to Deal with
PotentialGeneral Competitors, 67 FLA. L. REV. 977, 979 (2016).
64. See Butler, supra note 63, at 991 (quoting FTC assistant director Markus
Meier). In particular, the statute authorizing such safety regulations specifically warns
against using those regulations "to block or delay approval" of a generic drug. See 21
U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(8) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 116-259).
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necessary for effective competition in those markets. This
anticompetitive potential of the broad construction of the CFAA
ought to weigh strongly against that construction.
B. Platform Dominance and Input Foreclosure
The broad construction of the CFAA also impedes competition
in a different circumstance, where a computer service operates a
platform upon which other tools or services are built. Using the
CFAA, a monopoly-minded platform provider can knock out
innovative startups or other services on the platform, even while
subsuming their businesses for the platform's own.
An example is found in HiQ Labs, Inc. v. Linkedln Corp., which
involved the well-known website Linkedln, a platform for
65
professionals to share their resumes and career information. A
startup firm, hiQ, used LinkedIn's public data platform as a basis
for analysis to provide companies with novel insights such as
identifying career opportunities, recommending bonuses, or
identifying needed training.66
Initially, Linkedln offered no analogous service to hiQ and in
fact embraced a relationship with the company for several years,
perhaps because hiQ's services were a value-add atop LinkedIn's
platform. 6 7 However, in May 2017, Linkedln demanded that hiQ
cease and desist from accessing any further Linkedln data,
threatening to invoke the CFAA and essentially putting an end to
hiQ's business. 6 8 Just months later, Linkedln announced its own
new product, Talent Insights, which offered data insights highly
similar to hiQ's.69 In other words, Linkedln positioned itself to
absorb hiQ's business while simultaneously invoking the CFAA to
shut hiQ down. LinkedIn's introducing an alternative service to hiQ
may well have been procompetitive, but forcibly excluding hiQ was
almost certainly not. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit stated that
"LinkedIn's conduct may well not be 'within the realm of fair
competition."'

70

LinkedIn's exclusion of hiQ is an example of "input
foreclosure," a competition policy concept generally used in the
71
context of vertical mergers. Input foreclosure occurs when, in a
vertical supply chain, an upstream product is concentrated or
65. See 938 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2019).
66. See id. at 990.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 992.
69. See id. at 991-92, 992 n.6.
70. See id. at 998 (quoting Inst. of Veterinary Pathology, Inc.
Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 111, 127 (App. Ct. 1981)).

v.

Cal. Health Labs.,

71. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, VERTICAL MERGER

GUIDELINES 4 n.4 (June 30, 2020).
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monopolized, but a downstream market is competitive; for example,
there may be a single firm supplying oranges but many firms that
make and sell orange juice. 72 If the orange supplier decides to go
into the orange juice business as well, it could theoretically stop
selling oranges to all of the other juicers and thereby monopolize
the orange juice market.73
Input foreclosure has often been described as "harmful to
competition." 74 In United States v. Microsoft Corp., for example, the
dominant operating system maker took a variety of actions to
inhibit use of a third-party web browser Netscape Navigator,
relative to Microsoft's own Internet Explorer, including use of
contracts to foreclose installation of Netscape on the operating
system to an extent. 75 The D.C. Circuit held many of those actions,
including the contract-based foreclosure, to violate § 2 of the
Sherman Act.76
Similarly, LinkedIn foreclosed its data platform to hiQ thereby
favoring its own Talent Insights product. 77 To the extent that
LinkedIn had market power in its data, its acts would have fallen
within the logic of Microsoft. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit agreed that,
at least for purposes of a preliminary injunction, hiQ was likely to
succeed in showing that LinkedIn had tortiously interfered with
hiQ's contracts; it appeared to be willing to agree that hiQ would
likely succeed on an unfair competition claim as well.78
But LinkedIn's potentially anticompetitive actions of blocking
hiQ's access to data would have been absolved and permissible if
that blocking was permissible under the CFAA.79 As LinkedIn
argued and the court appeared to accept, if hiQ's access to
LinkedIn's data was "without authorization" under the CFAA, then
"hiQ could have no legal right of access to LinkedIn's data and so
could not succeed on any of its state law claims." 80 While the Ninth
Circuit ultimately found the CFAA inapplicable, it did so on narrow
grounds: because LinkedIn's website and thus data was "accessible

72. See
73. See
74. See
ECON. 345

id. at 6.
id.
Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 105 Q.J.
(1988); Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, Vertical Integration and Market
Foreclosure, 1990 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EGON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 205, 20506 (1990).
75. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59-64 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
76. See id. at 63-78.
77. See hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 992 (9th Cir. 2019).
78. See id. at 999. Though the court declined to reach the unfair competition claim
in view of its decision on tortious interference, the opinion's various references to conduct
"not .. .within the realm of fair competition" are telling. See id. at 998 (internal
quotations removed).
79. See id. at 999.
80. Id.
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to the general public" with no authentication system at all, the
81
Had
authorization elements of the CFAA were not invoked.
LinkedIn installed even a perfunctory or nominal authentication
system, 82 the HiQ decision suggests that the CFAA would have
applied to preempt hiQ's unfair competition claims, enabling
LinkedIn and other technology platforms to engage in input
foreclosure to cut off downstream businesses in favor of their own
offerings. 83
To be sure, commentators have vigorously disputed input
foreclosure-particularly the frequency and likelihood of it
84
Most
occurring in various contexts such as vertical mergers.
notably, Bork and the Chicago School took the view that foreclosure
was unlikely to occur as a result of a vertical merger because the
merged firm still stood to make profits by selling the intermediate
good: the orange supplier, for example, would have to forgo
substantial profits to be made from orange juicers were it to
foreclose on them. 8 5 Subsequent scholars disagreed, developing
economic models for predicting when vertical integration was likely
to occur. 8 6

The theoretical disagreement over vertical mergers and
foreclosure, however, is not relevant to foreclosure based on the
CFAA. That disagreement is over when foreclosure will occur if at
all; it is generally agreed that if foreclosure does occur, it will
87
But when
negatively affect competition and consumer welfare.

81. Id. at 1003.
82. For example, it could have users create a costless, anonymous account before
viewing LinkedIn data. LinkedIn is now doing so. See Peter Molnar, LinkedIn Is Ignoring
User Settings, PETER'S HOMEPAGE (July 1, 2020), https://petermolnar.net/article/
linkedin-public-settings-ignored/ [https://perma.cc/CV5K-T84Q].
83. See hiQ, 938 F.3d at 1001-02.
84. See, e.g., Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 127 YALE
L.J. 1962, 1966-67 (2018) (discussing differing views); Nikolas Guggenberger, The
Essential Facilities Doctrine in the Digital Economy: Dispelling Persistent Myths, 23
YALE J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 8-17), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3703361 [https://perma.cc/HTT5-MDKR] (reviewing arguments relating to the onemonopoly-rent and complementary-efficiencies theorems, often asserted in the context
of vertical antitrust analysis).
85. Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Robert Bork and Vertical Integration: Leverage,
Foreclosure, and Efficiency, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 983, 995-96 (2014) (describing BORK,
supra note 57, at 236-37).
86. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & Michael D. Whinston, The "¶Foreclosure"Effects of
Vertical Mergers, 147 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 207, 225 (1991)
(describing scholarship that "has formally demonstrated that vertical mergers resulting
in market foreclosure can indeed be an equilibrium phenomenon"); Jay Pil Choi & SangSeung Yi, Vertical Foreclosure with the Choice of Input Specifications, 31 RAND J. ECON.
717, 718 (2000); Hart & Tirole, supra note 74, at 205-06; Michael H. Riordan,
Anticompetitive Vertical Integrationby a DominantFirm, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 1232, 1233
(1998).
87. See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 925, 937 (1979).
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the CFAA is invoked to prevent a downstream competitor such as
hiQ from accessing an input such as LinkedIn data, input
foreclosure occurs by definition, since the effect of the CFAA is to
enjoin and even criminalize access to that input.88 The competition
harms of input foreclosure are thus at their apex when the CFAA
is used to cut off startups and other users of data platforms.
C. IncreasingTransactionCosts
The CFAA, broadly construed, also enables companies to
impair competition by introducing unnecessary transaction costs
and limiting consumer choice.
The quintessential example of a tool that enhances consumer
choice is a price comparison service: one that aggregates prices
across multiple vendors to allow consumers to make optimal
choices. Transaction costs stymie economic efficiency, 89 and finding
the best price is a significant transaction cost known as "search
cost," so tools for price comparison facilitate efficient markets. 90
Yet companies have invoked the CFAA to block price
comparison services. In Southwest Airlines Co. v. Farechase,Inc., a
company called Outtask used software to collect pricing and route
data from airlines in order to offer a service for comparing
airfares. 9 1 Southwest Airlines objected, claiming that the fares
listed on its public website were "proprietary" and that automated
collection of fare data was unauthorized under the Use Agreement
on Southwest's website. 92 On a motion to dismiss, the district court
found that Southwest's Use Agreement, while perhaps not
enforceable as a contract, nevertheless "directly informed Outtask
that their access was unauthorized," and therefore Southwest had
stated a claim under the CFAA.93 Southwest is far from the only
company to have invoked the CFAA to limit price comparison
services from accessing data: multiple cases have similarly held
that collection of computerized public pricing data can violate the
CFAA where contractual terms prohibit such collection.94
Blocking of price comparison services damages consumer
welfare by increasing consumers' costs of searching for the best
88. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)-(c), (g) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 116-259).
89. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 16 (1960).
90. See J. Yannis Bakos, Reducing Buyer Search Costs: Implications for Electronic
Marketplaces, 43 MGMT. SCI. 1676, 1677 (1997).
91. See 318 F. Supp. 2d 435, 437 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
92. See id. at 437.
93. Id. at 440.
94. See, e.g., Ryanair DAC v. Expedia Inc., No. 17-cv-1789, slip op. at 6 (W.D. Wash.
Aug. 6, 2018) (airfares); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 583-84
(1st Cir. 2001) (travel tours service); Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962,
969-70 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (real estate listings).
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deal. 9 5 Economists use the term "obfuscation" for activities that
heighten search costs, and find that obfuscation can "increase
average markups and the fraction of consumers buying from
96
"[L]owering search costs[] will
relatively high-priced firms."
so blocking services that
welfare,"
social
increase
unambiguously
97
Regarding airlines like
welfare.
decrease
will
costs
search
lower
found that blocking
study
2015
Southwest specifically, a
comparison shopping "is likely to lead to higher average airfares"
and ultimately "strengthen the market power of the major airlines,"
with a "total net consumer welfare impact" of "potentially $7.3
billion annually." 98 Across six different markets, the study found
that cutting off online price comparison services could raise prices
by 10-15%.99
Nevertheless, companies face strong incentives to leverage
legal tools such as the CFAA to limit price comparison shopping.ioo
For example, Southwest Airlines was able to raise its prices over
competitors, sometimes by over 20%, by refusing to be listed on
101
Propensity to obfuscate price
price comparison services.
comparisons is also apparent from another strategy that companies
use to thwart price comparison services: "drip" or "partitioned"
pricing, in which a vendor (such as a hotel) advertises a low base
price but then "drips" on mandatory additional costs (such as resort
fees). 1o 2 Drip pricing is effective in part because online price
comparison services often report only the base price and not the
add-on fees, so consumers shopping for the lowest price are duped

95. See generally Sara Fisher Ellison, Price Search and Obfuscation: An Overview
of the Theory and Empirics, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF RETAILING AND

DISTRIBUTION 287, 287-88 (Emek Basker ed., 2016).
96. Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities
on the Internet, 77 ECONOMETRICA 427, 430 (2009).
97. Dale O. Stahl II, OligopolisticPricing with Sequential Consumer Search, 79 AM.
ECoN. REV. 700, 709 (1989).
98. FIONA SCoTT MORTON, BENEFITS OF PRESERVING CONSUMER'S ABILITY TO
COMPARE AIRLINE FARES VIA

OTAS AND

METASEARCH SITES 3,

57

(2015).

99. See id. at 53.
100. See Glenn Ellison & Alexander Wolitzky, A Search Cost Model of Obfuscation,
32 RAND J. ECoN. 417, 435 (2012); Rory Van Loo, DigitalMarket Perfection, 117 MICH.
L. REV. 815, 837 (2019).
101. See Volodymyr Bilotkach, Reputation, Search Cost, and Airfares, 16 J. AIR
TRANSPORT MGMT. 251, 253 tbl.2 (2010).
102. See Gorkan Ahmetoglu, Adrian Furnham & Patrick Fagan, PricingPractices:A
CriticalReview of Their Effects on Consumer Perceptionsand Behaviour, 21 J. RETAILING
& CONSUMER SERV. 696, 697 (2014). The two terms differ in that "drip" pricing separates
the base price from the fees temporally (e.g., a resort fee announced only when the
traveler checks into the hotel); "partitioned" pricing may be known simultaneous to the
base price but is not presented to the prospective buyer in a unified sum (e.g., a sales tax
not shown on a price tag).
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into ultimately paying more.103 That practice is sufficiently
pervasive and harmful that the Federal Trade Commission held a
full-day conference to investigate how drip pricing "harms
consumers and reduces competition."1 0 4 Competition authorities in
multiple other countries have similarly considered whether such
strategies constitute unfair or deceptive practices.105 If interfering
with price comparison and increasing search costs through drip
pricing is a problem for competition, then it must be equally
problematic for competition to invoke the CFAA to block price
comparison services entirely.
Price comparison tools are just one of many welfare-enhancing
services with which the CFAA could interfere. 0 6 Another example
is privacy-enhancing software. The growing use of data to track and
analyze Internet users for highly targeted advertising (and perhaps
more nefarious reasons) has raised concerns among many.1 0 7 In
response, software developers have built tools to combat this loss of
privacy by blocking Internet transactions that facilitate online
tracking.108 Such software has received tremendous praise and

103. See Christopher Elliott, Why do travelersstill fall for drip pricing?, WASH. POST
(Aug. 12, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/trave/why-dotravelers-still-fall-for-drip-pricing/2020/08/12/ebd3d720-ca78-11 ea-b0e3d55bda07d66astory.html [https://perma.cc/AXW7-EKZL].
104. See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, A CONFERENcE ON THE EcoNOMICs OF DRIP
PRIcING 4 (2012) (statement of FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz).
105. See David Adam Friedman, RegulatingDrip Pricing, 31 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
51, 68-71, 86-91 (2020) (citing national authorities in United States, Canada, and
Australia).
106. A further example is the "plethora of third-party services have arisen which
arguably address the privacy and data concerns of Facebook's end users," which some
commentators have worried could be blocked under the Power Ventures decision. See
Venkat Balasubramani, EFF Weighs in on Facebook v. Power Ventures, TECH. & MKTG.
L. BLOG (May 27, 2010), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/05/eff weighsin o.
htm [https://perma.cc/59MV-MDWA].
107. See, e.g., David S. Evans, The Online Advertising Industry: Economics,
Evolution, and Privacy, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 37, 55-58 (2009); See Latanya Sweeney,
Discriminationin Online Ad Delivery, 11 AMC QUEUE No. 3, at 44 (Mar. 2013) (observing
patterns of racial discrimination in online advertising).
108. To explain further, many websites include hidden references to online tracking
services. When a person visits any of those websites, the hidden reference instructs the
person's computer to send a message to the tracking service, thereby alerting the
tracking service of the person's activities. In much the same way that a person can
transact with a business with anonymous cash rather than a traceable credit card,
privacy-enhancing software enables the person's computer to transact only with the
desired website and not the tracking service. See, e.g., Cory Doctorow, Adblocking: How
About Nah?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 25, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2019/07/adblocking-how-about-nah [https://perma.cc/KW4D-3W6M]. Privacy-enhancing
software is often conflated with software that blocks display of online advertisements
("ad-blockers"), but they are distinct insofar as the former focuses on invisible tracking
techniques that generally display no visible advertisements. See, e.g., Johan Mazel,
Richard Garnier & Kensuke Fukuda, A Comparison of Web Privacy Protection
Techniques, 144 COMPUT. COMM. 162 (2019).
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advertisers
online
Nevertheless,
usage.109
widespread
unsurprisingly dislike privacy-enhancing software and have used
terms of service to prohibit its use-terms of service that could be
powerfully enforced under the broad construction of the CFAA.11o
Examples such as these have led commentators to conclude
that the CFAA "limit[s] the valid tools consumers need to protect
themselves online." 1 11 Consumers and free markets benefit from
services like price comparison tools and privacy-enhancing
software, services that enhance competition and consumer choice.
That the CFAA, broadly interpreted, can render these tools illegal
demonstrates that the law has overstepped its intended bounds to
anticompetitive effect.

II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, COMPETITION, AND THE CFAA
The tension between the CFAA and competition policy may
also be understood from the perspective of intellectual property.
Two insights drive the usefulness of this perspective. First, the
1 12
CFAA has much in common with intellectual property regimes.
Second, intellectual property theory has long been concerned with
competition policy and antitrust law, and in particular, exclusions
from intellectual property protections generally reflect legislative
1 13
As a result, the analysis
judgments about competition policy.
below reveals how discrepancies between the CFAA and
intellectual property regimes, specifically information that is
protected under the CFAA but excluded under intellectual property
laws, are revealing as to competition concerns with the CFAA.

109. See Doc Searls, Beyond ad blocking-the biggest boycott in human history, Doc
SEARLS WEBLOG (Sept. 29, 2015), https://blogs.harvard.edu/doc/2015/09/28/beyond-adblocking-the-biggest-boycott-in-human-history/ [https://perma.cc/P4L2-QDAC].
110. See, e.g., Dami Lee, Spotify bans ad blockers in updated terms of service, THE
VERGE (Feb. 7, 2019, 3:41 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/7/18215845/spotify-adblockers-terms-of-service [https://perma.cc/DU63-X4ER]; cf. Anastasia Shuba, Athina
Markopoulou & Zubair Shafiq, NoMoAds: Effective and Efficient Cross-App Mobile AdBlocking, PROCEEDINGS ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHS., 126 (2018) (noting possible

relevance of and lack of case law on the CFAA).
111. Ashkan Soltani, ProtectingYour Privacy Could Make You the Bad Guy, WIRED
(July 23, 2013, 9:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/07/the-catch-22-of-internetcommerce-and-privacy-could-mean-youre-the-bad-guy/ [https://perma.cc/KT3R-75WF].
112. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
113. For general overviews of the relationship between intellectual property and
competition policy, see, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, Intellectual PropertyRights: The View from
Competition Policy, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 344, 344-47 (2009); Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Intellectual Property-AntitrustInterface, in 3 ISSUES IN COMPETITION
L. & POL'Y 1979 (2008); FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 1 (2003).
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Though intellectual property comes in many forms,1 14
particular attention is given to two: trade secrets and copyrights.
These two systems are chosen because the protection they offer are
the most akin to the ways in which the CFAA has been used to date;
indeed, many civil cases brought under the CFAA include trade
secret and copyright infringement allegations as well.11 5 Trade
secrets and copyrights are useful for a second reason: the two legal
regimes have been tied together in legislation. In particular, certain
critical amendments to the CFAA were enacted in tandem with
trade secrets legislation and borrowed text from copyright law. 11 6
Accordingly, the discussion below compares the CFAA to trade
secret and copyright law, and then reviews the relevant
relationships found in the legislative history.
A.

Trade Secrets

Trade secret law illuminates how the broad construction of the
CFAA interferes with competition policy. The broad construction
effectively allows firms to protect public information as if it were a
trade secret, and the limitation of trade secret protection to
nonpublic information is intended to promote competition.
Protecting proprietary information that brings value to a
business by virtue of its secrecy, trade secret law offers a range of
powerful remedies for unauthorized disclosure, including, like the
CFAA, injunctive relief and criminal penalties. 11 7 However, those
powerful remedies are carefully balanced against key limitations of
trade secret law, in view of competition concerns. Information
generally known to the public cannot be a trade secret. 118 Public
information such as airfare offers and social media profiles thus
cannot be protected under trade secret law. Furthermore, a
business must take "reasonable measures" to maintain the secrecy

114. Others include utility patents, design patents, trademarks, and rights of
publicity. See generally Gary M. Ropski & Michael J. Kline, A Primer on Intellectual
Property Rights: The Basics of Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights, Trade Secrets and
Related Rights, 50 ALB. L. REV. 405, 405 (1986).
115. See, e.g., hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 992 (9th Cir. 2019)
(noting assertion of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act along with the CFAA); EF
Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 580 (1st Cir. 2001); Shurgard Storage
Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2000);
Diamond Power Int'l, Inc. v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1326-27 (N.D. Ga. 2007);
I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. Sys., Ltd. v. Berkshire Info. Sys., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 521, 523
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
116. See infra Section Il.C.
117. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 116-259) (damages and
injunctive relief); § 1836(b)(2) (civil seizure); 18 U.S.C § 1832 (West, Westlaw through
P.L. 116-259) (criminal penalties).
118. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-259); Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974).
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of trade secrets. 1 19 Courts have often held that mere contractual
provisions, not backed by technical measures or substantial
12 0
enforcement capacity, fail to be "reasonable measures."
A narrow construction of the CFAA is consistent with trade
secret law since unauthorized access to information would occur
only if the information is kept secret such that the accessor lacks
entitlement to access it. The broad construction, however,
introduces inconsistency. A firm can make information public and
thus unprotectable under trade secret law, but nevertheless craft
terms of use prohibiting competitive uses of that information. The
firm would thus enjoy trade secret-like remedies without meeting
the requirements for trade secret protection.
Consider, for example, the Southwest Airlines case described
above. 12 1 Southwest Airlines could prevent its airfares from being
listed on price comparison services by treating those airfares as
trade secrets. 1 22 But it could do so only at the cost of not publishing
those airfares on Southwest's own website and enjoying the benefits
3
of rapid e-commerce. 12 By invoking the broad construction of the
CFAA to impede price comparison services while still listing prices
on its website, Southwest effectively obtained the advantages of
trade secret law without accepting the costs of secrecy.
As a second example, the Second Circuit found no trade secret
misappropriation where a company's ex-employee accessed
computer information without authorization, because the company,
in failing to implement technical protections on a computer housing
its sensitive client lists, had not taken "adequate measures" to
warrant trade secret protection.124 Had the company been able to
assert the CFAA at the time, it may have succeeded in showing a
violation under the broad construction of that law, effectively
circumventing the limitations of trade secret law.
That the CFAA provides broader protection than trade secret
law is not enough to answer the normative question of whether it
should; it is possible that trade secret law is inadequate and the
broader level of protection under the CFAA is in fact "preferable" as

119. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A).
120. See, e.g., Bison Advisors LLC v. Kessler, No. 14-cv-3121, slip op. at 10 (D. Minn.
Aug. 12, 2016); nClosures Inc. v. Block & Co., Inc., 770 F.3d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 2014); Fire
'Em Up, Inc., v. Technocarb Equip. (2004) Ltd., 799 F. Supp. 2d 846, 851 (N.D. Ill. 2011);
Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 901-02 (Minn. 1983).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
122. See, e.g., Sw. Stainless, LP v. Sappington, 582 F.3d 1176, 1189 (10th Cir. 2009)
(treating price lists as trade secrets).
123. See, e.g., Colo. Supply Co. v. Stewart, 797 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Colo. App. 1990)
(affirming that published price lists are not trade secrets).
124. Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C & C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053, 106364 (2d Cir. 1985).
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several commentators have claimed.1 2 5 Answering that normative
question requires reference to the rationale behind limiting trade
secrets, and that rationale is competition. The limits of trade secret
protection are designed "to strike the classic balance between free
competition on one hand and the prevention of unfair competition
on the other."1 26 The Supreme Court recognized the role of those
limitations in preserving competition in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp.127 There, the Court considered the argument that federal
patent law preempted state trade secret protection.128 To answer
that question, the Court began with the premise that patent law
was designed to encourage disclosure of inventions so that all
competitors may make use of them freely after expiration of any
granted patents. 1 29 Since trade secret protection arguably
dissuaded some inventors from making that disclosure, the
argument in favor of preemption was that trade secret protection
thwarted the congressional patent scheme favoring disclosure of
and subsequent competitive use of inventions.1 30 The Supreme
Court disagreed in large part because trade secret law, by virtue of
its numerous limitations, "provides far weaker protection in many
respects than the patent law."131 That weaker protection meant,
according to the Court, that there was a "substantial risk that the
secret will be passed on to . . . competitors" either illicitly or
through permissible reverse engineering. 1 32 In other words, the
limitations of trade secret protection allowed the Court to conclude
that trade secrets would have minimal effect on Congress's design
of making technologies open to competition.
Certainly, it may not be the case that every legislature has set
precisely the correct level of trade secret protection, but as Kewanee
Oil recognizes, at least some degree of limitation to the scope of
trade secrets is necessary to avoid unduly interfering with
competition. The CFAA, broadly construed, contains none of the
limitations of trade secret protection and enables an effective trade
secret-like remedy for public information; in so doing, that broad
construction is improperly contrary to the balancing of competition
interests found in trade secrets law.
125. Manion, supra note 32, at 304; see also references cited supranote 32.
126. Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit
Error When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493,
543 (2010).
127. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
128. See id. at 472.
129. See id. at 480-81.
130. See id. at 482 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232
(1964)) (considering whether state trade secret law "might constitute 'too great an
encroachment on the federal patent system to be tolerated"').
131. Id. at 489-490.
132. Id. at 490.
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B. Copyright
Like trade secrets, copyrights enable firms to prevent
competitors from using proprietary information. And as with trade
secret law, limitations of copyright law demonstrate the overreach
of the broad construction of the CFAA.
Copyright protection inheres in works of original authorship
13 3
and prohibits others from copying such protected works.
However, not all acts of copying are proscribed. Copyright
protection applies only to expressive elements of works, not
underlying facts. 13 4 Copyright inures to the author of the
information, even if the information is possessed by someone
else. 13 5 Furthermore, even expressive elements may be copied to
the extent allowed under the doctrine of fair use, which
encompasses copying for purposes such as news reporting, scholarly
3
quotation,' parody, education, and so on.1 s Finally, the
Constitution mandates that copyrights subsist only "for limited
times." 13 7
The CFAA, broadly construed, subverts all these elements of
copyright law. Cases such as Southwest Airlines demonstrate uses
of the CFAA to prevent copying of uncopyrightable factual
13 8
Power Ventures involved
information such as price lists.
assertion of the CFAA to protect data authored by third partiesindeed, third parties who consented to the copying.139 The CFAA
contains no fair use provision. And there is no time limit on a CFAAbacked ad hoc "copyright" regime.
As a result, under the broad construction of the CFAA, a
business can use cleverly crafted terms of service effectively to
invent a "para-copyright tool to secure exclusivity to otherwise
publicly accessible data." 140 Since most information today is stored
on computers, the computer operators need only draft terms of use
specifying copyright-like rules for how their information is to be

133. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976).
134. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
344-45 (1991) (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nat'l Enterprises, 471 U.S.
539, 556 (1985)).
135. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1976).
136. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
576-78 (1994).
137. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see 17 U.S.C. § 302 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116259).
138. See supra note 91.
139. See Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2016).
140. Wolfe, supranote 12, ¶ 5, at 303.
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used, and may then assert the CFAA against undesirable uses,
whether or not those uses would be copyright infringements. 14 1
That the CFAA, construed broadly, can reach beyond the limits
Congress explicitly set in the copyright statutes again
demonstrates the anticompetitive effect of that construction. The
traditional limitations of copyright law have long reflected a
"balance of competing claims upon the public interest," including
"promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the
other arts." 14 2 Those appeals to the public interest reflect a
competition concern: copyright protection, like other intellectual
property, excludes others from making productive uses of
copyrighted works and thereby, at least in the short term,
introduces static inefficiencies that reduce consumer welfare. 143
The overall aim of copyright protection is to promote the creation of
new works that, in the long run, increase consumer welfare through
dynamic efficiency, and the various exceptions and limitations to
copyright protection "minimize copyrights potential harm to static
competition" and "ensure that it is not used to harm dynamic
competition." 14 4 Thus, insofar as broad construction of the CFAA
"upset[s] the careful balance that the Copyright Act has struck
between authors and society," 14 5 that broad construction interferes
with the balance of competitive interests that Congress set in
enacting copyright law.
Copyright law has long concerned itself with avoiding
expansive intellectual property protections that go "beyond the
limits of [the] specific grant" of copyright.146 To allow an unrelated
criminal law-a computer trespass statute, no less-to render the
copyright statutes practically superfluous would effectively open a

141. In Explorica, the district court found that access to a website was unauthorized
under the CFAA based on a copyright notice on the website. See EF Cultural Travel
BV v. Explorica Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 580 n.6 (1st Cir. 2001). The tour pricing information
that was accessed, however, was factual and almost certainly not copyrightable. See
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347-48 (1991). Perhaps
recognizing this discrepancy, the First Circuit on appeal took no position on the district
court's reliance on the copyright notice to determine whether access was authorized. See
Explorica, 274 F.3d at 583 n.16.
142. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994) (quoting Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
143. Ariel Katz, Copyright and Competition Policy, in HANDBOOK OF THE DIGITAL
CREATIVE ECONOMY 209, 209 (Ruth Towse & Christian Handke eds., 2013); see Marcel
Boyer, Efficiency Considerationsin Copyright Protection, 1 REV. ECON. RES. COPYRIGHT
ISSUES 11, 19 (2004).

144. Katz, supra note 143,
145. Galbraith, supra note
146. Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Though the Supreme Court
recognized in the immediately
copyright law. See id. at 442.

at 210.
9, at 365.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 441 (1984).
made that statement with respect to patent law, it
following paragraph that the principle applied equally to
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back door for circumventing longstanding judicial precedents
designed to protect competitive markets.
C. Intellectual Property in the CFAA's Legislative History
In enacting the current version of the CFAA, Congress was
aware of the overlap between that law and intellectual property
rules discussed above. The text and legislative history confirm that
Congress did not intend the CFAA to enable companies to devise ad
hoc schemes that render trade secret and copyright law
superfluous.
As enacted in 1984 and amended in 1986, the CFAA applied
only to a limited class of "Federal interest" computers and
information; any competition concerns with the statute would have
been limited to this narrow class.147 The key provisions rendering
the CFAA applicable to computers generally, such that private
competition would be a relevant concern under the statute, appear
in the National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of
1996.148 But that law did not stand alone: it was Title II of the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, of which Title I was 'a
1 49
The
comprehensive federal trade secret protection law.
provisions of Title I included all of the careful balancing elements
discussed above. 1 50 The proponents of the EEA specifically
observed that the trade secret law included "a number of
safeguards" meant to protect competition and employee mobility,
and the Managers' Statement on the bill called out in more detail
limitations of trade secret protection such as reasonable measures
and public information.151
The drafters of the 1996 CFAA amendments were also keenly
152
aware of copyright law, indeed borrowing the latter's text.
147. As initially enacted, the CFAA covered only national security-sensitive
information, financial records, and government computers. See Counterfeit Access Device
and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 §1030(a)(1)-(3), 18 U.S.C §1030 (West,
Westlaw through P.L. 116-259). It was subsequently expanded to include offenses
related to "Federalinterest computer[s]" and password trafficking. Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act of 1986 §2(d), 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1986). Federal interest computers included
non-governmental networks of computers connected across different states, see id.
§ 2(g)(4), but "[a]t a time when use of the Internet remained in its infancy, few crimes
would have been included in [the statute's] reach." Kerr 2010, supra note 17, at 1565. A
1994 amendment to the CFAA did not affect the statute's scope substantially. See id. at
1566.
148. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030; Kerr 2010, supra note 17, at 1568 (discussing how, under
the 1996 amendment, "every computer connected to the Internet is a 'protected
computer' covered by 18 U.S.C. § 1030").
149. See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (1996).
150. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C § 1893(3)(A)-(B) (1996).
151. 142 CONG. REc. 27,116-20 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kohl).
152. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(i) (using test from 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)); S. REP. No.
104-357, at 8 (1996).
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Importantly, they intended the two legal regimes to be distinct.
Recognizing in its report that in many cases information accessed
in violation of the CFAA "is also copyrighted," the Senate committee
observed that unauthorized access to that information "may
implicate certain rights under the copyright laws." 1 53 Nevertheless,
the committee recognized that the "crux of the offense" under the
CFAA was not misuse of copyrighted material but rather "the abuse
of a computer to obtain the information." 154
It would have made little sense for Congress to jettison the
careful balancing of copyright and trade secret law with a computer
trespass statute so broad as to enable ad hoc intellectual property
rights. The committee report's description of the 1996 amendments
as "privacy protection coverage" against "computer trespasses"
confirms that Congress intended the statute to be distinct from
intellectual property misappropriation (and intended the protected
information to be private, not public). 155 Proponents of the key 1996
amendments to that law specifically warned that they "do not want
this law used to stifle the free flow of information or of people from
job to job," suggesting that they recognized the importance of
balancing competition interests at the time the CFAA was being
debated.156 To be sure, the report acknowledges correctly that the
CFAA provides additional causes of action for "theft of intangible
information." 1 57 No doubt the CFAA overlaps with information
theft, but that phrase in the report is no warrant to redefine
information theft, particularly in ways inconsistent with the trade
secret provisions of Title I of the EEA.
None of this is to say that the intellectual property laws are
perfectly sufficient to deal with all manner of proprietary business
information. But to the extent that loopholes remain, the proper
avenue is not the CFAA but Congress, which has repeatedly
patched those laws to deal with problems such as boat hull designs
and semiconductor manufacturing. 15 8 Because the CFAA contains
no limitations parallel to those found in trade secrets or copyright
law, it does not merely strike the wrong balance with respect to
competition; it ignores the necessary balance entirely.

153. S. REP. No. 104-357, at 7.
154. Id. at 7-8.
155. Id. at 4; see United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 857 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2012) (en
banc).
156. 142 CONG. REc. 27,116 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kohl). While that statement
was made with respect to the Title I trade secret provisions of the EEA rather than the
Title II amendments to the CFAA, it seems unlikely that the bill's sponsors would have
intended Title II to have a policy consequence directly contrary to the aims of Title I.
157. S. REP. No. 104-357 at 7.
158. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 902(a)(1), 1301(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-259).
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The conflict between the CFAA and competition policy is not
inherent to the statute itself, but largely a product of the broad
construction taken by several federal courts of appeals, under
which violations of conditions on how information is to be used
constitute access "without authorization" under the CFAA.159
Because the broad construction allows a computer operator to set
unilateral terms that render access to computer information
"unauthorized," that construction is the root of the anticompetitive
behaviors thus described: by deeming competitive business activity
to be "unauthorized" use under the CFAA, a computer operator
offering a data service, such as a social media website or ecommerce platform, can restrict competition, gobble up startups,
and inhibit consumer welfare-enhancing services.160
Competition in technology markets is better protected by
narrower constructions of the CFAA. At least two such narrower
constructions have been proposed, one of which uses an
entitlement-based test and the other of which uses a code-based
test.
Under the entitlement-based test, a person entitled to access
computer information is authorized and thus beyond the reach of
the statute regardless of how that information is later used.161 The
advantage of this test with respect to competition policy is that a
computer service operator cannot differentiate under the CFAA
between ordinary uses of the service (social media website visitors,
airline travelers) and competitive uses of computer information
(social media competitors, airfare price comparators). A firm that
entitles the former class of users to access information cannot
leverage the CFAA to nevertheless close itself off to the latter
16 2
competitive uses.

159. See cases cited supra note 7.
160. See supra Section I.
161. See Brief for Petitioner at 17, Van Buren v. United States, No. 19-783 (U.S. July
1, 2020); United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 5087, 511-12 (2d Cir. 2015).
162. Theoretically, the computer operator could grant authorization on an individual
basis, evaluating each prospective user for likelihood of being a competitor and denying
access to them. Indeed, in many cases, computer operators have blocked specific
computers by their numeric Internet Protocol addresses, to keep competitors or
unwanted users out. See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058,
1068 (9th Cir. 2016); Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 969 (N.D. Cal.
2013); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2000). This
approach is likely to be of limited utility, for two reasons. First, users are not readily and
permanently identifiable, especially online; a competitor could easily change IP
addresses or hire third-party users to query data on its behalf. See, e.g., Power Ventures,
844 F.3d at 1068, 1068 n.5; Craigslist, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 970. Second, as a general
matter, computer operators must establish prospective rules of access well in advance of
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The code-based test assesses authorization under the CFAA by
whether a computer user circumvented an access restriction
implemented in computer software code.163 This test more strongly
guards against anticompetitive behavior. As seen in the examples
of cases described above, the computer operator will frequently send
a specific cease-and-desist letter to competitors or startups thereby
rendering access unauthorized under the CFAA.164 This post hoc
revocation of access by mere legal notification would not be possible
under a code-based test which would require the computer operator
to reconfigure the computer to block the undesired competitor from
access.
A computer operator could perhaps implement a technological
restriction on access by a competitor or undesirable user, for
example by blocking a specific IP address. Circumventing such a
restriction may be a CFAA violation. 165 These sorts of technical
restrictions will be of limited utility because identifying specific
computer users is often difficult.1 6 6 Nevertheless, it is worth
recognizing that even a narrow construction of the CFAA cannot
fully prevent the statute from being asserted to anticompetitive
ends.
But forcing firms to employ technological restrictions rather
than terms of use to suppress competition has several advantages
with respect to competition policy. Technological blocking is more
difficult to implement than writing a cease-and-desist letter, and
increasing the costs of competition-suppressing behavior reduces
the likelihood that firms will engage in it.167 Technological
restrictions, unlike cease-and-desist letters, have the potential to
be erroneously overbroad such that they block access by legitimate
users, meaning that they may attract greater public scrutiny. 168

users accessing a computer, so real-time assessment of whether a user is a competitor
will be virtually impossible. See Grimmelmann, supra note 13, at 1503-04. Of course, a
computer operator could retrospectively deny access to a small handful of especially
undesirable competitors; this possibility is discussed infra notes 165-168.
163. See, e.g., Kerr 2003, supranote 5, at 1649; Bellia 2016, supranote 6, at 1444.
164. See, e.g., Power Ventures, 844 F.3d at 1067; hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp.,
938 F.3d 985, 992 (9th Cir. 2019); Sw. Airlines Co. v. Farechase, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d
435, 440 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
165. See Craigslist, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 969-70. But see Kerr 2016, supra note 9, at
1168-69 ("Merely circumventing an IP block does not violate trespass norms.").
166. See supratext accompanying note 162.
167. See Creighton et al., supra note 59, at 981 ("[I]t seems logical to expect that
rational firms would prefer, all else equal, exclusionary strategies that are both low-cost
and that provide a strong upside, including the opportunity to acquire relatively durable
market power.").
168. Cf. Benjamin Edelman, Web Sites Sharing IP Addresses: Prevalence and
Significance, BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & Soc'Y (Sept. 12, 2003), https://cyber.
harvard.edu/archived content/people/edelman/ip-sharing/
[https://perma.cc/5SQWQLJE] (noting prevalence of IP addresses shared across multiple websites).
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And enforcement of antitrust law is more feasible against
technological measures than against CFAA-backed terms of use
because the latter may raise Noerr-Pennington issues.1 6 9 By
requiring firms seeking to undermine competition to use
technological approaches rather than terms of use, the code-based
construction of the CFAA helps to ensure that anticompetitive
conduct is more costly, more visible, and easier to prosecute.
CONCLUSION

Competition policy is a worthwhile frame for studying a wide
17 0
and the CFAA
variety of matters in technology law and policy
should be no different. This article considered the CFAA's effects on
competition by juxtaposing cases brought under that statute
against contemporary problems in antitrust policy, such as
interoperability, input foreclosure, and price obfuscation. It further
used the perspective of intellectual property and antitrust to
highlight ways in which the CFAA goes past accepted norms and
legislative decisions on the proper balance of laws to preserve
competitive markets.
Based on these observations, the article concludes that
narrower constructions of the CFAA are preferable, at least with
respect to competition policy. Certainly, the proper construction of
171
But
the statute must turn on further considerations as well.
insofar as the competitive effects of the CFAA have not been
considered in detail so far, it is hoped that the present analysis can
help to enrich future consideration of the CFAA. More broadly, the
CFAA appears to be one example in a larger trend of using public
interest statutes to inhibit competition and protect dominant firms'
incumbency.172 The exercise of considering how seemingly
unrelated laws like the CFAA can be used to limit competition

169. More specifically, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine generally provides that the
bringing of a colorable legal action in court cannot be deemed illegal activity under the
antitrust laws. See Prof'l Real Est. Inv'rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49,
56 (1993) (discussing E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127,
136-38 (1961)); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669 (1965).
Several courts have held that threat letters in preparation for litigation are similarly
immunized under that doctrine. See, e.g., Sosa v. DirecTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 942 (9th
Cir. 2006); Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir.
2000). While those cases did not involve the CFAA, they suggest that cease-and-desist
letters prior to bringing a CFAA action may be immune to antitrust scrutiny under the
Noerr-Penningtondoctrine.
170. For another example by this article's author, see Duan 2020, supra note 53, at
394-99.
171. See supranotes 9-21 and accompanying text.
172. This is Bork's observation about "[p]redation by abuse of governmental
procedures." See BORK, supra note 57, at 347.
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would seem a fruitful exercise for those who hope to preserve
competitive markets.
Just before this article went to press, the Supreme Court
issued its decision in Van Buren v. United States.1 73 Essentially
adopting the narrow construction of the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, the Court held that a then-police sergeant's search of
the department's license plate database for unauthorized personal
gain did not constitute "exceed[ing] authorized access" under the
law. 174 Primarily relying on construction of the CFAA's text, the
Court concluded that a violation of the statute occurs only when one
accesses "information that a person is not entitled to obtain by
using a computer that he is authorized to access," 175 rejecting the
government's contention that access for an unauthorized purpose
constitutes a violation.1 76 Bolstering that narrow construction of
the law was the Court's policy concern that "the Government's
interpretation of the statute would attach criminal penalties to a
breathtaking amount of commonplace computer activity," such that
"millions of otherwise law-abiding citizens [would be] criminals." 177
The Court's adoption of the narrow construction of the CFAA
goes a long way toward avoiding anticompetitive misuse of the
statute, but it does not prevent such misuse completely. Under the
decision, computer services cannot leverage the CFAA to enforce
terms of use that disallow accessing data for purposes of building
competitive services. 178 However, the Court specifically declined to
adopt a code-based test, suggesting that terms of use that wholly
exclude certain competitors from accessing data are still
enforceable under the CFAA.179 Such wholesale exclusion of
competitors is not uncommon, as seen from the cases reviewed in
this article.180 As a result, the CFAA will continue to be an area ripe
for discussion with respect to competition and antitrust policy in
the foreseeable future.
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